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I. INTRODUCTION
I previously have criticized what I call "tax myopia"'-the tendency of the
tax law to view itself as an isolated body of law separate from other areas of
law.2 I have argued that this tax-centric thinking has adverse consequences in a
variety of situations where the tax cognoscenti too often slight nontax
learning.3 Among those I have criticized for their myopic view of tax law is
Professor Linda Galler.
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A.B. 1979; Cornell Law School, J.D. 1983; Boston University, LL.M. (Taxation) 1988. I
want to thank John Applegate, Jean Braucher, Dorothy Brown, J. Shepard Bryan I, Karen
Burke, Tom Eisele, Grayson McCouch, Joe Tomain, and Glen Weissenberger for their
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am grateful for the heroic research assistance
provided by Jim Hart and Frank Rieman.
1 I Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to be Tax
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517 (1994) [hereinafter Caron, Tax Myopia]; see also Paul L.
Caron, When Does Life Begin for Tax Pwposes?, 68 TAX NOTES 320, 320 (1995)
[hereinafter Caron, When Does Life BeginJ.2 Other commentators have embraced this "provocative... comment on the
relationship between tax and other legal disciplines." Michael Livingston, Confessions of an
Econonist Killer: A Reply to Kronman's "Lost Lawyer," 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1592, 1602
n.27 (1995) (book review); see also Jeffrey L. Jacobs, Tax Planning for a Religious Jihad,
64 TAXNOTES 1626, 1626 (1994).
3 See Paul L. Caron, Estate Planning Implications of the Right of Publicity, 68 TAX
NOTES 95, 95-96 (1995) (criticizing courts for subjecting right of publicity embodied in
famous decedent's name to federal estate tax without consideration of how such interests are
treated under state property law); Paul L. Caron, 7he Role of State Court Decisions in
Federal Tax Litigation: Bosch, Erie, and Beyond, 71 OR. L. REv. 781 (1992) (criticizing
courts and commentators for inadequate attention to principles of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), in debate over appropriate mechanism to determine meaning of state
law in federal tax litigation); Caron, Tax Myopia, supra note 1, at 531-54 (criticizing courts
and commentators for ignoring nontax developments in statutory construction and legislative
process theory in advocating unique role for legislative history in construing Internal
Revenue Code (the "Code")); Caron, When Does Life Begin?, supra note 1, at 324
(criticizing courts and Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") for grappling over
definition of "person" for tax purposes without consideration of how issue has been
addressed in other areas of law).
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In a 1992 article, 4 Galler used Davis v. United States5 as a vehicle for
examining the appropriate amount of deference that courts should give to
revenue rulings issued by the Internal Revenue Service.6 According to Galler,
the Court in Davis: (i) endorsed a new and dramatically heightened standard of
judicial deference in directing that "considerable weight" be given to revenue
rulings; 7 and (ii) spawned confusion in the lower courts by not discussing the
applicability of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,8 the seminal Supreme Court decision dealing with judicial deference to an
executive agency's construction of a statute it is charged with administering.9 I
previously have contended that Galler's criticisms reflected a misunderstanding
of both tax and nontax principles.' 0
On the tax front, Galler misstated the law prior to Chevron and Davis.
According to Galler, the law was "reasonably clear" that "most" courts refused
to give any weight to revenue rulings and treated them as merely the "litigation
position" of one of the parties;" t only a "few" courts gave "some
consideration" to revenue rulings.' 2 My view, as supported by the case law
cited in Galler's own article, 13 is that courts' attitudes toward revenue rulings
in the pre-Chevron and pre-Davis periods depended on their position on the
underlying substantive tax issue in the case. Where courts agreed with the
Service's position in the revenue ruling, they would claim to give it greater
weight in their decision; where courts disagreed with the Service's position,
4 Linda Galer, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72
B.U. L. REv. 841 (1992).
5 495 U.S. 472, 479-86 (1990) (relying on several revenue rulings in denying
charitable contribution deduction for parents' support payments to their children serving as
unpaid Mormon missionaries).
6 "A 'revenue ruling' is an interpretation by the Service that has been published in the
Internal Revenue Bulletin. It is the conclusion of the Service on how the law is applied to a
specific set of facts." Rev. Proc. 96-1, § 2.05, 1996-1 I.R.B. 8, 13 (emphasis added); see
also Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6) (as amended in 1983); id. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (as
amended in 1983); Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814.
7 Galler, supra rte 4, at 870-72, 876.
8 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
9 Galer, supra note 4, at 872-76. Under Chevron's two-step inquiry, a court must first
determine whether statutory language is unambiguous. If it is, a court must reject an
agency's interpretation that does not conform to that language. However, if the statute is
ambiguous, the court must defer to an agency's "reasonable" interpretation of the language.
467 U.S. at 842-44.
10 Caron, Tax Myopia, supra note 1, at 558-63.
11 Gailer, supra note 4, at 849-50.
12 d. at 851.
13 Caron, Tax Myopia, supra note 1, at 559 n.198.
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they would give the ruling little or no weight. 14
On the nontax front, Galler unhesitatingly embraced the view of Chevron
as sparking "a revolution in administrative law" 15 by demanding wholesale
judicial abdication to executive agencies. As a result of her fealty to this
conventional wisdom, Galler strained to rework revenue rulings within the
Chevron framework to justify giving them no deference in judicial
proceedings. 16 Moreover, since the publication of her article, more
sophisticated administrative law scholarship had emerged arguing that the
"major transfer of interpretative power from courts to agencies" portended by
Chevron simply had not occurred. 17
More recently, this journal carried an article by Galler which tries to
construct an elaborate theory of the role of revenue rulings in the post-Chevron
environment on a similarly flawed tax and nontax foundation.' 8 According to
Galler, the 1990s have witnessed a discernible campaign in the federal courts to
give controlling weight to revenue rulings. There is "an ardent willingness [on
the part of federal courts of appeals] to accede to revenue rulings," 19 and
Galler has unearthed three distinct judicial approaches for granting such
untrammeled discretion to the Service.20 In her world, the Tax Court alone is
willing to stand up to the barbarians at the gate through "its absolute refusal to
yield to IRS revenue ruling positions." 21 Based on this analysis, Galler
envisions "profound consequences" to the practice of tax law. 22
The taxpayer's choice of forum will now "categorically determine the
substantive outcome of a case. If the IRS can be expected to cite a revenue
ruling, taxpayers are likely to lose in federal court because federal judges defer
to rulings. Only the Tax Court offers an opportunity for full consideration of
taxpayer arguments."23 But if taxpayers seek refuge in the Tax Court, they will
14 Id. at 558-59, 563.
15 Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in thw Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283, 307 (1986).
16 Caron, Tax Myopia, supra note 1, at 559-61 (criticizing Galler's argument that
second step of Chevron was not applicable to interpretive rules like revenue rulings that are
issued without satisfaction of public notice and comment requirements).
17 Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J 969,
981 (1992).
18 Linda Caller, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent
Standards, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 1037, 1077-78 (1995).
19 Id. at 1062.
20 Id. at 1061-74.
21 Id. at 1059.
22 Id. at 1039.
23d.
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be confronted by the pro-government bias of that court.24 According to Galler,
"[ilnereased deference in the federal courts has fractured the foundational basis
for concurrent jurisdiction and created an untenable situation for taxpayers
involved in tax disputes with the government." 25 Indeed, the doctrinal disarray
in the courts of appeals "breeds a loss of faith in the system's fairness and may
prompt taxpayers to seek unlawful means of avoiding taxes." 26 The only hope
to avoid this cataclysm is for either the Supreme Court to categorically hold
that revenue rulings carry absolutely no weight in a judicial proceeding or
Congress to prohibit their citation. 27
I argue in this article that, as in her earlier work, Galler is afflicted with
both hyperopia and myopia; she sees neither the tax trees nor the nontax forest.
Part II of this article focuses on the tax trees and disputes the claim that there
has been a dramatic increase in the amount of deference that federal courts give
to revenue rulings. This part criticizes Galler's reliance on the courts'
descriptions of the deference standard without considering whether these
different verbal formulations have had any real impact on the results in the
cases. This part examines the available data and finds no support for the
increased judicial deference thesis.
Part I focuses on the nontax forest and argues that the post-Chevron
revisionist scholarship and the distinction between the decision-making and
decision-justifying functions of judging provide helpful lenses through which to
view the federal courts' treatment of revenue rulings. This part explores the
developing consensus among courts and commentators debunking the myth that
Chevron has significantly affected the actual results of administrative law cases.
This part contends that revenue rulings are used by federal judges primarily to
explain their decision to construe a Code provision in a particular way. These
nontax authorities help illuminate our very different views of the tax landscape.
Galler sees a new tax order in which an omnipotent Service uses revenue
rulings to beat taxpayers into submission before compliant federal judges
unwilling to intercede. In contrast, I see merely a continuation of the historic
practice of federal courts using a variety of tools at their disposal, including
revenue rulings, to interpret the language of the Code.
II. THE TAx TREES
Galler argues that the federal courts of appeals in the 1990s give far more
deference to revenue rulings than they have in the past, and that they employ
2 4 Id. at 1089.
25 Id. at 1095.
26 Id. at 1093.
2 7 Id. at 1094-95.
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three distinct doctrinal approaches to do So. 28 Unfortunately, the evidence she
cites does not support her view, and other evidence indicates that there has
been no shift in how federal courts treat revenue rulings.
A. Increased Deference to Revenue Rulings
Galler sees a "noticeable and substantively significant" 29 difference in the
amount of judicial deference afforded revenue rulings by the Tax Court and by
the courts of appeals: "The Tax Court is unique in its absolute refusal to yield
to IRS revenue ruling[s]," 30 while the courts of appeals possess "an ardent
willingness to accede to revenue rulings." 31 However, the evidence both in her
article and elsewhere demonstrates that this is a false dichotomy.
Galler's own work belies the view of the Tax Court as a bastion against
marauding revenue rulings. In her earlier article, she argued that the Tax Court
"consistently" regarded revenue rulings as nothing more than the "litigation
position" of one of the parties,32 yet she cited an equal number of cases for
both this general rule33 and the supposedly "rare exceptions" where the Tax
Court gave revenue rulings "some consideration. " 34 In her later article, Galler
transmutes the Tax Court's embrace of the "litigation position" rule into a
"customary rule of no-deference. " 35 She cites seven newer cases for the
"litigation position" rule,36 but concedes through the citation of six other
2 8 The choice of 1990 as the triggering date for the overhaul in the federal courts of
appeals' treatment of revenue rulings is a curious one. Apparently it took the courts of
appeals over five years to apply the lessons of Chevron in the tax context, and the trend was
not yet apparent at the time of her 1992 article.
29 Galler, supra note 18, at 1062.
30 ld. at 1059.
3 1 Id. at 1062.
3 2 Caller, supra note 4, at 849-50.
33 Stark v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 243, 250-51 (1986); Crow v. Commissioner, 85
T.C. 376, 389 (1985); Browne v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 723, 731 (1980) (Hall, J.,
concurring); Estate of Lane v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 404, 406-07 (1975), affd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 613 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1980).
34 Knapp v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 430, 442 (1988) (Whitaker, J., concurring), affd
on other grounds, 867 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1989); Twin Oaks Community, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1233, 1252 (1986); Reinhardt v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 511, 520
(1985); Knowlton v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 160, 165 (1985), affd on other grounds, 791
F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1986).
35 Galler, supra note 18, at 1060.
36 Pasqualini v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 1, 8 (1994); Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner,
102 T.C. 721, 726 n.8 (1994); Spiegelman v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 394, 405 (1994);
Rath v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 196, 205 n.120 (1993); Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner,
1996]
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newer cases that the Tax Court "occasionally" gives "some consideration" to
revenue rulings. 37
Galler also presents an unconvincing case for abdication by the courts of
appeals during the 1990s. In her earlier article, she contended that "most"
courts of appeals adhered to the "litigation position" rule while only a "few"
courts followed the "some consideration" exception, 38 yet she cited an equal
number of cases for both the general rule39 and the exception4 to the rule.41
100 T.C. 216, 232 (1993), aff'd on other grounds, 25 F.3d 1043 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 486 (1994); Sunstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1305, 1307
(1992), affid on other grounds, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 83 (1994);
Induni v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 618, 624 n.4 (1992), affid on other grounds, 990 F.2d 53
(2d Cir. 1993).37 Spiegelman v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 394, 397-98 (1994); Geisinger Health Plan
v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 394, 405 (1993), affid on other grounds, 30 F.3d 494 (3d Cir.
1994); Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 127, 136 n.4 (1992), rev'd on other
grounds, 28 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 1994); Estate of Ford v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1507, 1511 n.8 (1993), aff'd on other grounds, 53 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1995); Martin
v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1529, 1531 (1992); Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 376, 379 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 40 F.3d 224
(7th Cir. 1994); see also Burton v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 622, 629 (1992) ("Although
revenue rulings are not binding on this Court, they may be useful in interpreting a statute
based on their own intrinsic value.").
38 Galler, supra note 4, at 850-51.
39 Disabled Am. Veterans v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 1991);
Flanagan v. United States, 810 F.2d 930, 934 (10th Cir. 1987); Canisius College v. United
States, 799 F.2d 18, 22 n.8 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987); Oxford
Orphanage, Inc. v. United States, 775 F.2d 570, 575 n.9 (4th Cir. 1985); Bencivenga v.
Western Pa. Teamsters & Employers Pension Fund, 763 F.2d 574, 580 (3d Cir. 1985);
Becker v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1984); Frysinger v. Commissioner,
645 F.2d 523, 525 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Stahmann Farms, Inc. v. United States, 624
F.2d 958, 960 (10th Cir. 1980); Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 688, 695
n.10 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 418 U.S. 1 (1974); Stubbs, Overbeck &
Assocs. Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1142-47 (5th Cir. 1971); Miller v.
Commissioner, 327 F.2d 846, 850 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 816 (1964); Kaiser v.
United States, 262 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1958), aff'd on other grounds, 363 U.S. 299
(1960).
40 Salomon, Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 837, 841 (2d Cir. 1992); Progressive
Corp. v. United States, 970 F.2d 188, 194 (6th Cir. 1992); Musco Sports Lighting, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 943 F.2d 906, 908 (8th Cir. 1991); Foil v. Commissioner, 920 F.2d 1196,
1201 (5th Cir. 1990); United States Trust Co. v. IRS, 803 F.2d 1363, 1370 (5th Cir. 1986);
Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833, 836 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986); Amato v. Western
Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1411 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. diwirsed, 474 U.S. 1113
(1986); Anselmo v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1208, 1213 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985); Watts v.
United States, 703 F.2d 346, 350 n.19 (9th Cir. 1983); Ricards v. United States, 683 F.2d
[Vol. 57:637
TAX MYOPIA MEETS TAX HYPEROPIA
Three years later, she reversed course, recognizing that virtually every circuit
during the pre-1990 period had "issued contradictory opinions regarding the
weight of revenue rulings. In some cases, revenue rulings receive[d] special
consideration, while in others the same courts declare[d] that rulings are
entitled to none." 42 Galler then describes a sea change during the 1990s
stemming from the courts of appeals' "eager (and historically unprecedented)
adoption of deferential standards."43
There are several flaws in Galler's analysis. As I explain in detail in Part
I of this article, Galler fails to distinguish between the decision-making and
decision-justifying functions of judging. 44 For example, she fanatically pursues
her "litigation position" or "some consideration" distinction, describing in
detail each instance when a court that has supposedly adopted one approach has
used the other in a later case.45 Because Galler mistakenly believes that these
1219, 1224 n.12 (9th Cir. 1981); Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); United States v. Hall, 398 F.2d 383, 387
(8th Cir. 1968); Commissioner v. 0. Liquidating Corp., 292 F.2d 225, 231 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 898 (1961).
41 Indeed, Caller's circuit-by-circuit breakdown of the "litigation position" or "some
consideration" distinction presents, without explanation, the anomalous result that in four
circuits (the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits) the number of cases cited for the
exception exceeds the number of cases cited for the general rule. Galler, supra note 4, at
850-51 nn.58-59. In addition, for three circuits (the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits), an
equal number of cases is cited for each rule. Id. In only three circuits (the Third, Fourth,
and Tenth Circuits) are more cases cited for the general rule than for the exception. Id.
Galler does not present any information on the D.C. and First Circuits.
42 Caller, supra note 18, at 1062. Galler also complained that "[elxplanations of the
inconsistencies [were] never provided." Id.
43 I. at 1063.
44 See infra notes 127-30, 150-55 and accompanying text.
45 A particularly illuminating example is Caller's treatment of Geisinger Health Plan v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1656 (1991), rev'd, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir.), on remand,
100 T.C. 394 (1993), aft'd, 30 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994). The issue in the case was whether
an HMO qualified for tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The parties agreed on the
applicable legal standards in regulations and revenue rulings for determining when the
promotion of health constitutes a qualified charitable purpose and differed only as to the
application of those standards to the facts of the taxpayer's case. The four opinions rendered
in the case each rely, in varying degrees, on several revenue rulings in making this fact-
specific determination. 30 F.3d at 500-02; 985 F.2d at 1216-19; 100 T.C. at 400-05; 62
T.C.M. at 1661-64.
Galler converts this pedestrian tax controversy into an example of the Tax Court
"stray[ing] from its customary rule of non-deference... because it understood the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit to require that the rulings at issue be given weight." Caller,
supra note 18, at 1060. She contends that the Tax Court reaffimed its commitment to the
1996,]
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different rhetorical flourishes somehow affect the ultimate tax result, she
contends that a court is guilty of an improper judicial zig-zag each time it
employs an approach different from the one used in a prior case. In contrast, a
proper understanding of the decision-making and decision-justifying distinction
reveals that courts use the "litigation position" or "some consideration"
approaches merely as tools to explain and add support to their decisions
reached on other grounds. Thus, in cases where the courts have decided to
reject the Service's position, the revenue ruling is downplayed as nothing more
than a party's "litigation position"; in other cases, where the courts have
decided to accept the Service's position, "some consideration" is given to the
revenue ruling.46 The precise verbal formulation used by a court is mere
"litigation position" approach, but that it was required by Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
742 (1970), aft'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971), to follow "a
court of appeals decision that is 'squarely in point,' where an appeal lies to that court of
appeals." Galler, supra note 18, at 1060. She then speculates as to why the Tax Court in the
second case, out of "literally hundreds" of cases involving revenue rulings, would adopt the
anathematical "some consideration" approach. After a journey that meanders through the
"strong proof' doctrine, the substance or procedure distinction, federalism, comity, Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Hanna v. Plwner, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), Galler
discovers the uniqueness of Geisinger Health Plan in the "significant role" that revenue
rulings historically have played in the qualification of hospitals for tax-exempt status. Caller,
supra note 18, at 1060 n.117. Her analysis is deficient in a number of respects.
The Tax Court rightly did not cite the Golsen rule because it is simply not applicable to
cases such as Geisinger Health Plan that are remanded back to the Tax Court by the court
of appeals for reconsideration. See, e.g., MIcHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK,
FEDERAL IcNm TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 85 (3d ed. 1995); see generally
Jeffrey L. Patterson & Susan B. Hughes, The Golsen Rule 18 Years Later, 20 TAX ADV.
123 (1989). Moreover, as discussed in infra note 46 and accompanying text, the "litigation
position" or "some deference" positions are merely two sides of the same coin. As Galler
herself recognizes elsewhere (see supra notes 34 & 37), Geisinger Heath Plan is merely one
of many cases in which the Tax Court has given some deference to revenue rulings.
46 Indeed, courts often refer to both positions in the same opinion. See, e.g., Lucky
Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C._, _ (1995) (although neither party cited revenue
ruling and it represented merely one party's litigation position, court "deem[ed] it necessary
to consider it"); Krumhorn v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 29, 59 n.20 (1994) (although
revenue ruling represented merely one party's litigation position, facts of case "justiflied]
skepticism of the type manifested by the Commissioner in [the revenue ruling]");
Spiegelman v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 394, 405 (1994) (although revenue ruling
represented merely one party's litigation position, court considered revenue ruling because
its "underlying rationale ... [was] sound"); Roth v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 196, 207
n.10 (1993) (although revenue ruling represented merely one party's litigation position,
court considered revenue ruling "in special circumstances"); Cato v. Commissioner, 99
T.C. 633, 647 (1992) (although revenue ruling represented merely one party's litigation
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window-dressing that does not have any effect on the ultimate resolution of the
case.
Despite her emphasis on the decision-making function, Galler does not
support her grandiose claim of increased judicial deference with any hard data.
This failure is particularly troubling in light of the visibility given recently to
the need for empirical support of such doctrinal assertions47 and the special
position, court gave revenue ruling "particular scrutiny" because it was cited in legislative
history); St. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 457, 471 (1991) (although
revenue ruling represented merely one party's litigation position, court concluded that
revenue ruling was correct), a'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 34 F.3d 1394
(8th Cir. 1994); Rome I, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 697, 702 (1991) (although revenue
ruling represented merely one party's litigation position, "court may adopt the conclusion
and rationale of a revenue ruling"); Texas Learning Technology Group v. Commissioner,
96 T.C. 686, 697 (1991) (although revenue ruling represented merely one party's litigation
position, revenue ruling did not contradict court's analysis), affid on other grounds, 958
F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1992); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492, 501-02 (1984) (although
revenue ruling represented merely one party's litigation position, facts of case "justiftied]
skepticism of the type manifested by the Commissioner in [the revenue ruling]"); First
Chicago Corp. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2089, 2100 n.10 (1995) (although
revenue ruling represented merely one party's litigation position, court felt "compelled to
consider and reconcile this ruling with the facts and circumstances of this case").
47 Judge Posner has reignited this debate with his customary dlan by advocating that
law professors undertake "detailed empirical inquiries into the presuppositions of legal
doctrines." RcIHARD A. PosNER, OvERcom[NG LAw 210 (1995); see also David L.
Faigman, "Nornatve Conitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Copnent of
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 602 (1991) ("The Court retains
legitimacy only so long as it remains within accepted bounds when exercising its discretion.
Empirical research assists in the definition and enforcement of those boundaries."); Robert
W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, & the "Middle Ground," 91 MiCH. L. RLy. 2075, 2087
(1993) ("If I had the power ... I would use it to try to promote more empirical work,
institutional description, and law-in-action studies. Sometimes I think I would happily trade
a whole year's worth of the doctrinal output turned out regularly by smart law review
editors and law teachers for a single solid piece describing how some court, agency,
enforcement process, or legal transaction actually works."); Vicki C. Jackson, Enpiricism,
Gender, and Legal Pedagogy: An EAperiment in a Federal Courts Seminar at Georgetown
University Law Center, 83 GEo. L.J. 461, 469 (1994) ("Much ink has been spilled on the
benefits of quantitative empirical research on legal problems ... ."); Craig A. Nard,
Eapincal Legal Sciolarslp: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy and the
Profession, 30 WAKE FORST L. REV. 347, 349, 368 (1995) (bemoaning that "legal
profession is bereft of empirical scholarship" and calling for more of such scholarship to
furnish "the profession with a compass in our sometimes foggy legal waters"); Edward L.
Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1890
(1988) ("[J]udges are increasingly concerned with the empirical basis and the real world
effects of their decisions."). For criticism of Judge Posner's view, see Clark Freshman,
1996]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL[o
suitability of the heightened judicial deference thesis to empirical testing.48
Galler focuses merely on the words courts use to purportedly describe their
treatment of revenue rulings. She does not attempt to measure whether these
words have any real effect on the outcome of tax cases. If she did, she would
find that the shifting verbal formulations have not had any discernible impact
on how judges actually decide tax cases.
For example, the results of the cases cited in Galler's own article contradict
her increased judicial deference thesis. 49 In the eleven years since Czewon,50
the courts of appeals have accepted the Service's revenue ruling position in a
lesser percentage of cases than they had done in the eleven years preceding
Czewon:51
Were Parida Wdiliam and Ronald Dwordn Separated at Birth?, 95 COLUM. L. REv.
1568, 1573 (1995) (book review) (describing Posner's brand of empiricism as "drive-by
judging and scholarship"); Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming Posner, 105 YALE LJ. 581, 599
(1995) (book review) (arguing that type of empirical work envisioned by Posner "is beyond
the range of the most gifted scholars, let alone the most gifted federal judges").
4 8 There are three reasons why the data reported in this article cannot simply be
dismissed as either "bean-counting" or "drive-by empiricism." First, where the central
question is whether a court should defer to an agency's statutory interpretation, the actual
results in the cases should be a paramount consideration. Second, the major administrative
law empirical works on Cwvron, discussed in infra notes 103-36 and accompanying text,
have been universally applauded by commentators and courts for their focus on the real-
world effects of the doctrine. Third, Galler herself has raised the statistical issue by
claiming, without any empirical support, that a taxpayer's choice to litigate a tax
controversy in district court rather than in Tax Court "may categorically determine the
substantive outcome of a case." Galler, supra note 18, at 1039. Empirical data thus is
properly brought to bear to test Galler's view that "taxpayers are likely to lose in federal
court because federal judges defer to [revenue] rulings." Id.
49 For a comparison of how these tax results compare with the results in other nontax
administrative law studies, see infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
50 Although Oevron was decided on June 25, 1984, I have included the three 1984
cases in the pre-Chevron period because they were decided either before or soon after that
date.
51 For these purposes, I have included only those cases where the position in the
revenue ruling dealt with an underlying issue in the case. I gave Galler the benefit of the
doubt by excluding cases that arguably indicated a willingness by the courts to reject the
Service's position during the 1985-95 period. See Guilzon v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 819,
822-23 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting position in notice); American Stores Co. v. American
Stores Co., 928 F.2d 986, 993 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating court's willingness to reject revenue
ruling, but did not need to do so on facts before it).
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TABLE ONE: TREATMENT OF REVENUE RULINGS
IN FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS CASES CITED BY GALLER
Period Court Accepts Ruling Court Rejects Ruling
1985-95 71%52 29%53
1974-84 92%54 8 %55
Of course, a more complete test of Galler's claim of increased judicial
deference should consider the results in all cases over a lengthy period in
52 United States v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 38 F.3d 329, 334-36 (7th Cir.
1994); Gillespie v. United States, 23 F.3d 36, 39-41 (2d Cir. 1994); GiUllis v. Hoechst
Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1145-47 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1369 and
114 S. CL 1540 (1994); Walt Disney, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 F.3d 735, 738-41 (9th Cir.
1993); Johnson City Medical Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 975-77 (6th Cir. 1993);
Kinnie v. United States, 994 F.2d 279, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1993); Geisinger Health Plan v.
Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210, 1215 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993); Salomon, Inc. v. United States,
976 F.2d 837, 841-43 (2d Cir. 1992); Progressive Corp. v. Commissioner, 970 F.2d 188,
193-94 (6th Cir. 1992); Wood v. Commissioner, 955 F.2d 908, 913-14 (4th Cir.), cert.
dimiyed, 505 U.S. 1231 (1992); CenTra, Inc. v. United States, 953 F.2d 1051, 1053-57
(6th Cir. 1992); Foil v. United States, 920 F.2d 1196, 1201-03 (5th Cir. 1990); United
States Trust Co. v. Internal Revenue Service, 803 F.2d 1363, 1370 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1986);
Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1411-12 (2d Cir. 1985), cet.
dLined, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986); Anselmo v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1208, 1213 n.5
(11th Cir. 1985).
53 Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 980-82 (6th Cir. 1994); American Stores
Co. v. American Stores Co. Retirement Plan, 928 F.2d 986, 994 (10th Cir. 1991);
Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988); Flanagan v. United States,
810 F.2d 930, 934 (10th Cir. 1987); Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833, 835-38
(2d Cir. 1986); Canisius College v. United States, 799 F.2d 18, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1986).
54 Weil v. Retirement Plan Admin. Comm., 750 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1984);
Certified Stainless Services Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1984);
Schneier v. Commissioner, 735 F.2d 375, 376-77 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1190 (1985); Strick Corp. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1194, 1195-1202 (3d Cir. 1983),
cet. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984); Confederated Tribes v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878, 881 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983); Washington State Dairy Products Comm'n
v. United States, 685 F.2d 298, 300-01 (9th Cir. 1982); Ricards v. United States, 683 F.2d
1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1981); Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192, 1194-1200 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); Treadco Tires, Inc. v. United States, 604
F.2d 14, 16-17 (5th Cir. 1979); Julio R. & Estelle L. Found., Inc. v. Commissioner, 598
F.2d 755, 757 n.3 (2d Cir. 1979); Gino v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir.),
cell. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Groves v. United States, 533 F.2d 1376, 1380-81 (5th
Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
5 5 Estate of Lang v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 1980).
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which the federal courts of appeals have cited revenue rulings in their opinions.
Given space and time constraints, however, I have compared data from a
randomly selected year 56 in both the post-Chevron (1992) and pre-Oievron
(1982) periods57 and again have found no evidence that the courts of appeals
have increased the rate at which they accept the Service's position articulated in
revenue rulings:58
TABLE TWO: TREATMENT OF REVENUE RULINGS
IN FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS CASES
Year Court Accepts Ruling Court Rejects Ruling
1992 75%59 25%60
1982 78%61 22%62
In addition, the alleged increased deference by the courts of appeals is not
reflected in the data from the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.63 For example, in 1990-the last year for which these data are
56 1 again gave Galler the benefit of the doubt by choosing a post-Cwvron year that,
based on the cases cited in her article, supra note 53, would not be overrepresented with
cases that rejected the Service's position in revenue rulings.
5 7 The cases were culled from Lexis (USAPP file, FEDTAX library) and Westlaw
(CTA file, FrX library) searches for all references to revenue rulings in the federal courts
of appeals during the two years.
58 1 again have included only those cases where the position in the revenue ruling dealt
with an underlying issue in the case.
59 See Indiana Nat'l Corp. v. United States, 980 F.2d 1098, 1102 (7th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2335 (1993); Salomon, Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 837, 841-43
(2d Cir. 1992); Estate of Vak v. Commissioner, 973 F.2d 1409, 1413-14 (8th Cir. 1992);
Progressive Corp. v. United States, 970 F.2d 188, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1992); Wood v.
Commissioner, 955 F.2d 908, 913-14 (4th Cir.), cert. dilssed, 505 U.S. 1231 (1992);
CenTra, Inc. v. United States, 953 F.2d 1051, 1053-57 (6th Cir. 1991).
60 See Amerco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 979 F.2d 162, 165-68 (9th Cir. 1992); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner, 972 F.2d 858, 860-64 (7th Cir. 1992).
61 See Briggs v. Commissioner, 694 F.2d 614, 615 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 928 (1983); Confederated Tribes v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983); City Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 943, 946 (11th
Cir. 1982); Schenk v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1982); Washington
State Dairy Products Comm'n v. United States, 685 F.2d 298, 300-01 (9th Cir. 1982);
Ferrill v. United States, 684 F.2d 261, 264 (3d Cir. 1982); Bank of Cal. v. United States,
672 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1982).
62 See Hutchinson Baseball Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 696 F.2d 757, 760-63
(10th Cir. 1982); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 1982).
63 In years where the Annual Report of the Convirioner of Internal Revenue was not
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available64 and the first year of alleged revenue ruling ascendancy-the
percentage of cases decided in favor of the taxpayer actually increased to their
highest percentage of the prior ten years:
TABLE THREE: TAXPAYER SUCCESS RATES
IN FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS CASES
Year Taxpayer Success Rate65
1990 20.0%
1989 9.7%
1988 18.7%
1987 11.9%
1986 9.9%
1985 12.1%
1984 11.3%
1983 15.3%
1982 15.4%
1981 18.1%
1980 17.0%
Similarly, the district courts have not adhered to the alleged increased
judicial deference required by the courts of appeals during the 1990s. Two
sources of data in the Annual Report indicate that taxpayers were more
successful in district court litigation over the 1990-94 period than they were in
the prior five-year period. The percentage of cases decided in the taxpayer's
favor of the taxpayer increased substantially over the prior five-year period, 66
available, I used information from the Annual Report of the Office of Offe Counsel or the
Data Book of the COxizioner of Internal Revenue.
64 Although this information is no longer included in the Annual Report, I have filed a
Freedom of Information Act request for the release of the 1991-94 data. The request was
pending as this article went to press.
65 1 have excluded those cases in which the decisions were partially in the taxpayer's
favor and partially in the government's favor because there is no way to tell whether these
partial dispositions favored one party or the other. See Caron, Tax Myopia, supra note 1, at
578 n.280.
66
TABLE FOUR: TAXPAYER SUCCESS RATES
IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT CASES
Five-Year Period Taxpayer Success Rate
1990-94 26.3%
1985-89 20.6%
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as did the taxpayer's monetary savings. 67
The data thus paint a very different picture than that sketched by Galler.
She simply has not demonstrated that anything has changed in how the federal
courts use revenue rulings to decide tax cases. The courts employ the same
rhetorical flourishes in either following or rejecting revenue rulings that they
have used for decades, and there has been no discernible increase in judicial
forbearance in the federal courts of appeals and the federal district courts.
Indeed, Galler's thesis unravels further as she criticizes the courts of appeals
for not adopting a "uniform deference standard" 68 and instead propagating
"three separate approaches" 69 for giving increased deference to revenue
rulings.
B. Three Approaches to Increased Deference
As discussed earlier, 70 Galler implicitly concedes that in her earlier article
she wrongly ascribed a neat dichotomy to the courts of appeals during the pre-
1990 period, with most courts properly hewing the "litigation position"
approach and only a few unenlightened courts giving "some consideration" to
revenue rulings. Yet, Galler magnifies her error in her 1995 article by
identifying three divergent approaches to giving complete deference to revenue
I again have excluded those cases in which the decisions were partially in the
taxpayer's favor and partially in the government's favor because there is no way to tell
whether these partial dispositions favored one party or the other. The only reported data on
taxpayer success rates for the 1990-94 period is for 1990; my pending Freedom of
Information Act request, supra note 64, seeks the release of the 1991-94 data.
67
TABLE FIVE: TAXPAYER MONETARY SAVINGS
IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT CASES
Five-Year Period Taxpayer Monetary Savings
1990-94 29.0%
1985-89 20.0%
I have used five-year periods to minimize year-to-year variations and to protect against
the skewing effect of cases with particularly high stakes. See Caron, Tax Myopia, supra
note 1, at 580 n.284. Monetary savings are defined as the taxpayer's overall savings in
taxes, penalties, and interest as a percentage of the overall amounts at issue. They include
all cases disposed of during the period, whether by dismissal, trial, or settlement. There is
an inexplicable gap in the data in the Annual Reports for 1986; my pending Freedom of
Information Act request, supra note 64, seeks the release of the 1986 data.
68 See Galler, supra note 18, at 1062-63.
6 9 d. at 1038-39 (emphasis added).
7 0 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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rulings as support for her theory that the 1990s constitute the decade of judicial
abdication. 71
Under the first approach, courts defer to revenue rulings that are
"reasonable and consistent" with the underlying Code provision at issue.72
Under the second approach, courts defer to revenue rulings as the product of
the agency charged with interpreting the Code.73 Under the third approach,
courts defer to revenue rulings because they believe they are required to do so
under Chewon.74 Galler parses the case and reports the following Circuit-by-
71 See Galler, supra note 18, at 1063-73.
72 Galler wrongly characterizes this as a "radical approach," first adopted in a 1979
district court opinion (Dunn v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 991, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
Galler, supra note 18, at 1063-64. In fact, the "reasonable and consistent" language has a
long pedigree as applied to revenue rulings. See, e.g., Conway County Farmers Ass'n v.
United States, 588 F.2d 592, 600 (8th Cir. 1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 546
F.2d 759, 761 (7th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 915 (1977); Akron Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. United States, 510 F.2d 1157, 1161 (6th Cir. 1975); Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Economy Finance Corp. v. United States, 501 F.2d
466, 482 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975); Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 422 F.2d 90, 94 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 345
(1971); United States Gypsum Co. v. United States, 253 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1958);
Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 442 F. Supp. 681, 688 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd on
other grounds, 609 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 981 (1980); Reinstein v.
United States, 359 F. Supp. 428, 430 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Blass v. United States, 344 F.
Supp. 669, 670 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Transport Equipment Co. v. United States, 331 F. Supp.
769, 770 (W.D. Wash. 1971); Herren v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 1198, 1207 (S.D.
Tex. 1970), aftd, 443 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1971). The Tax Court also has applied the
"reasonable and consistent" language to revenue rulings in several cases. See, e.g., Butka
v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 110, 129 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 886 F.2d 442 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Pollack v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 142, 147 (1977); Satrum v. Commissioner,
62 T.C. 413,419 (1974); Catron v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 306, 315 (1968).
73 Galler criticizes the courts that have embraced this approach for not explaining why
the Service's tax expertise justifies deference to revenue rulings. First, Galler challenges the
notion that the tax lawyers at the Service are "better as a group than the [tax lawyers in the]
private bar." Galler, supra note 18, at 1069-70. Second, although Galler concedes the
Service's greater tax expertise compared to judges (with the notable exception of Tax Court
judges), she contends that this expertise "should not automatically give rise to deference."
d. at 1070. Of course, these considerations apply equally to questions of deference to
administrative agencies generally, and I criticize, infra notes 99-155 and accompanying
text, Galler's inattention to, and misreading of, much of the administrative law scholarship
on these issues.
74 For my criticism of Galler's application of the Chevrmn doctrine, see infra notes 99-
155 and accompanying text.
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Circuit "adoption" of these three approaches:
TABLE SIX: CIRCUIT-BY-CIRCUIT ADOPTION
OF GALLER'S THREE "APPROACHES" TO
INCREASED JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO REVENUE RULINGS
Circuit Approach # I Aroach # 2 Aproach # 3
D.C.
First
Second X75  X76
Third X7  _
Fourth X__
Fifth X79  X80
Sixth X8 1  X82  __X 83
Seventh I
75 Gillespie v. United States, 23 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1994); Salomon Inc. v. United
States, 976 F.2d 837, 841-43 (2d Cir. 1992); Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d
1402, 1411-12 (2d Cir. 1985), ceit. dsmiled, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986).
76 Brook, Inc. v. United States, 799 F.2d 833, 836 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986).
77 Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1145 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1369 and 114 S.Ct. 1540 (1994); Geisenger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985
F.2d 1210, 1215 n.2, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993).
7 8 Wood v. Commissioner, 955 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. dbnissed, 505
U.S. 1231 (1992).
79 Guilzon v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 819, 822 (5th Cir. 1993); Foil v.
Commissioner, 920 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 1990).
80 United States Trust Co. v. Internal Revenue Service, 803 F.2d 1363, 1370 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1986).
8l Johnson City Medical Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 976 (6th Cir. 1993);
Kinnie v. United States, 994 F.2d 279, 286 (6th Cir. 1993); CenTra, Inc. v. United States,
953 F.2d 1051, 1056 (6th Cir. 1992); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th
Cir. 1988).82 Babin v. Commissioner, 23 F.3d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 1994).
83 Johnson City Medical Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1993); CenTra,
Inc. v. United States, 953 F.2d 1051 (6th Cir. 1992).
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Circuit Approach # 1 Approach # 2 Approach # 3
Eighth
Ninth X
8 4  X 85
Tenth
Eleventh X
86
Federal
Galler is unfazed that of the seven circuits that have purportedly "adopted"
one of these approaches, four have adopted more than one and the Sixth Circuit
has adopted all three. She attributes this to widespread judicial lawlessness,
with the courts violating "customary principles of intracircuit stare decisis
under which the decisions of three judge panels are binding on subsequent
panels unless overruled by the court en banc." 87 She reserves special ire for the
"confused and erratic" Sixth Circuit,88 and heaps scorn on Judge Milburn for
embracing all three approaches in separate opinions.89 She bemoans the
difficulty of predicting the level of scrutiny that the Sixth Circuit will give to
future revenue rulings because it has failed to quantify with precision the exact
degree of deference required. In Galler's world, the difference between "great
deference," 90 "some deference," 91 and "persuasive authority" 92 is all-
important.
Galler's analysis can be faulted on both narrow and broad grounds. She
does not accurately state the "position" of various circuits; many circuits that
she claims have not staked out a position have in fact embraced one or more of
these approaches, 93 and other circuits to which she attributes a position have
84 Walt Disney, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 F.3d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1993).
85 Washington State Dairy Prod. Comm'n v. United States, 685 F.2d 298, 300-01 (9th
Cir. 1982); Ricards v. United States, 683 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1981).
86 Anselmo v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1208, 1213 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985).
87 Galer, supra note 18, at 1063.
88 Id. at 1067.
89 M. at 1073.
90 Progressive Corp. v. United States, 970 F.2d 188, 194 (6th Cir. 1992).
91 Kinnie v. United States, 994 F.2d 279, 286 (6th Cir. 1993).
92 Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 981 (6th Cir. 1994).
93 See, e.g., Foutz v. United States, 72 F.3d 802, 805 (10th Cir. 1995) (Chevron
approach); Eastern Inv. Corp. v. United States, 49 F.3d 651, 657 (10th Cir. 1995)
(reasonableness approach); United States v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 38 F.3d 329,
334-35 (7th Cir. 1994) (reasonableness and agency expertise approaches); Phillips v.
TABLE SIX (con't): CIRCUIT-BY-CIRCUIT ADOPTION
OF GALLER'S THREE "APPROACHES" TO1N AqFB IIflTCTAL DEFERENCE TO REVENUE RULINGS
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also endorsed other approaches. 94 A more fundamental criticism is that these
three approaches have absolutely no bearing on a court's ultimate decision
whether to defer to a revenue ruling. It thus should not be surprising that courts
pick and choose among these approaches in justifying their decisions. Because
opinion writing is art rather than science, courts vary their use of these three
approaches to fit different situations, "much as a golfer selects the proper club
when he gauges the distance to the pin and the contours of the course." 95
Galler's plea that "[tihe plethora of diverse and conflicting approaches followed
by the lower courts suggests a need for high court resolution" 96 thus rings
hollow.97 There is no need for the Supreme Court to dictate club selection to
the lower federal courts as they craft opinions to explain their construction of
the Code in light of the available interpretive evidence, including revenue
rulings.
III. THE NONTAX FOREST
Galler's thesis of increased judicial deference to revenue rulings also is
undercut as she either misreads or ignores nontax evidence that is contrary to
her position. In light of her failure to support her theory with empirical tax data
as described above, 98 it is not surprising that she similarly slights nontax
empirical research from the administrative law and litigation fronts.
A. Chevron
In her earlier article, 99 Galler unhesitatingly embraced the conventional
view of Chvon as "markedly alter[ing] the Court's approach to the allocation
of interpretive authority between federal courts and administrative agencies" 10o
Commissioner, 851 F.2d 1492, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Chevron approach); Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1286-87 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (agency expertise
approach), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).94 See, e.g., Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210, 1214 (3d Cir.
1993) (agency expertise approach).
95 Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IowAL. REv. 195, 215-16 (1983).
96 Galler, supra note 18, at 1094.
97 Caller's claim in the next sentence that "[tihe issue has percolated long enough to
show that the question is ripe for review and to provide the Court with the benefit of
experiential data," Ud, is amazing given the complete lack of data presented in her article.
98 See supra notes 47-67 and accompanying text.
99 Galler, supra note 4, at 860-61.
100 Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations qf
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by requiring courts to defer more often to agencies. 10 1 I previously criticized
Galler's questionable placement of revenue rulings within the Chevron
framework to justify giving them no deference in judicial proceedings. 102 In
any event, more sophisticated administrative law scholarship had begun to
emerge debunking the myth that Chevron in practice had dramatically affected
the actual results of administrative law cases.
In my earlier article, 103 I explored Professor Thomas W. Merrill's
contention that Chevron had not significantly altered the frequency with which
the Supreme Court deferred to agency interpretations of statutes. 104 Merrill
found that the percentage of cases in which the Court accepted an agency's
statutory interpretation actually decreased in the post-Chevron 1984-90 Terms
compared with the pre-Chevron 1981-83 Terms. 05 Moreover, the percentage
of cases in which the Court accepted the agency's interpretation in the 1984-90
Terms was lower in cases that applied Chevron.1°6 Although an earlier study 107
suggested that "[s]ome lower courts, especially the D.C. Circuit, had treated
CIevron like the magna carta of deference, mandating greater respect for
Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1275, 1275-76; see also 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD .
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 110 (3d ed. 1994) (describing Chevron as
"one of the most important decisions in the history of administrative law"); Cass R.
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLuM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990)
(characterizing Chevron as "one of the very few defining cases in the last twenty years of
American public law"); Rebecca H. White, The Stare Deciss "Exception" to the Chevron
Deftrence Rade, 44 FLA. L. REV. 723, 723 (1992) (claiming that Chevron initiated a "new
era ofjudicial review of agency lawmaking").
101 Curiously, Galler did not cite the major empirical work reporting that deference to
agency interpretations increased sharply in the lower federal courts following Chevron.
Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron ration: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administradve Law, 1990 DuKE LJ. 984. The Schuck and Elliott study received
heady praise soon after its release. See, e.g., William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and
Administrative Rulemnaking, 1991 DuKE U. 106, 147 n.222 ("path-breaking study"); S. Jay
Plager, The United States Cowts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional
Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853,
861 n.22 (1990) ("an excellent example of the contribution empirically-based work can
make to an understanding of the legal system").
102 Caron, Tax Myopia, supra note 1, at 559-61 (criticizing Galler's argument that
second step of Chevron was not applicable to interpretive rules like revenue rulings that are
issued without satisfaction of public notice and comment requirements).
103 Id. at 561-63.
104 Merrill, supra note 17, at 970.
105 Id. at 981-82 (70% post-Chevron v. 75% pre-Chevron).
106 Id. at 981 (59% of Chevron cases v. 70% of total number of cases).10 7 Schuck & Elliott, supra note 101.
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administrative interpretations than had theretofore been the case," l08 Merrill
noted evidence in the prior study that "the 'Chevron effect' in the lower courts
may have been only temporary." 1°9 He also predicted that Chevron would have
little impact on the amount of deference given to agency interpretations in the
lower federal courts as the Court's indifference to Chevron became apparent.110
I noted that other commentators and courts soon confirmed the accuracy of this
prediction. "'
For example, Professor Russell L. Weaver agreed that "GL-vron's
importance has been exaggerated. Chevron did not profoundly alter either the
Supreme Court's conduct, or that of the lower federal courts." 112 The Sixth
Circuit also surveyed the Chevron landscape and concluded that the courts had
"travel[led] far without going anywhere:"" 13
Quite franly, the degree to which courts are bound by agency interpretations
of law have been like quicksand. The standard has been constantly shifting,
steadily sinking, and, from the perspective of the intermediate appellate courts,
frustrating.... So, after all these years of debate and after much judicial ink
has been spilled, we are back to essentially the old rule that courts are not
bound by agency interpretations of law and that courts are to apply laws based
on the court's interpretation of the law's reasonable meaning. 114
In her 1995 article, Galler cites Merrill on six different occasions in
discussing judicial deference to administrative agencies, 115 yet she fails to
mention that Merrill's thesis is directly contrary to her claim of increased
judicial deference to revenue rulings after Chevron.116 She also refers to my
108 Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 358 (1994). For a similar view, see Gary J. Edles, Has Steelworkers
Burst Chevron's Bubble? Some Practical Implications of Judidal Deference, 10 REv. LrriG.
695, 699 (1991).
109 Merrill, supra note 17, at 984.
110 Id.
I 1 Caron, Tax Myopia, supra note 1, at 562.
1 12 Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 Mo. L. REv. 129, 131
(1993).
113 Ohio State Univ. v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 996
F.2d 122, 123-24 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 114 S. Ct.
2731 (1994).
114 Id.
115 Galler, supra note 18, at 1051 nn.69, 71 & 72, 1052 nn.75 & 77, 1069 n.170.
116 The closest Galler comes to conceding this point is in an odd footnote discussing
the impact of Chevron on deference to tax regulations:
Of course, the standards for judicial review of regulations are themselves subject
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Tax Myopia diagnosis1 17 without mentioning that I had identified her as one of
the most afflicted; she does not respond to, or even acknowledge, my criticism
of her failure to consider the application of this general administrative law
thinking to the subject of judicial deference to revenue rulings. These omissions
are troubling in light of the developing consensus among commentators and
courts endorsing Merrill's thesis.
Merrill recently extended his study to include the 1991 and 1992 Terms
and observed "more-or-less business as usual on the Chevron front." 118 The
overall rate of acceptance of agency interpretations rose slightly to match that
in the pre-Chevron period. 119 Although the percentage of deference cases
employing Chevron was "roughly consistent" with the trend in the prior
study, 120 Merrill found that Oevron appeared to be playing "an increasingly
peripheral role in the decisions," 121 and was used like "just another pair of
pliers in the statutory interpretation tool chest." 122 Other commentators have
to vigorous debates, particularly as to the repercussions of [Chevron]. That dialogue,
however, is taking place in leading law reviews among noted scholars and jurists, so
that judges know well which sources to consult for advice in answering questions that
may arise in tax litigation. Moreover, the participants in the regulation debate are
experts in a variety of substantive areas.
M. at 1042 n.16; see also infra note 194.
117 Id. at 1077-78 ('Professor Paul Caron has used the phrase 'tax myopia' to
describe the tendency of judges, lawyers, and law professors to regard tax law as a self-
contained body of law that is somehow different from other areas."); see also id. at 1078
n.222 ("Professor Caron's article also documents the perception that tax lawyers are
different from other lawyers. He ultimately concludes that these misperceptions have
impaired the development of both tax law and other fields by isolating the debates in the tax
area from those in other fields.").
118 Merrill, supra note 108, at 360.
119 d. at 359-60 (from 70% to 75%). For statistics on the pre-Ozevron period see
Merrill, supra note 17, at 982.12 0 Merrill, supra note 108, at 361.
121 d.
12 2 M. at 362. Merrill concluded that "the apparent marginalization of the deference
doctrine in the last Term means that it is still not possible to say that Oevron has had any
lasting impact on the Supreme Court, at least in terms of pressing the Court toward greater
deference to agency views." M. at 363. For other empirical Oevron work, see Linda R.
Cohen & Matthew L. Spritzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1994, at 65, 105-06 (observing "no retreat from Chevron" by Court through 1988,
with possibility of "some retreat" in 1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibriwn, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26,
72 (1994) (federal agencies prevailed in 62% of civil cases during 1993 Term).
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noted this revisionist view of Chevron,123 although there remain some
holdouts. 124 Last year, a symposium in the Duke Law Journa 25 viewed the
failure of the Chevron revolution through the prism of judges, focusing on the
decision-making and decision-justifying norms I have referred to earlier. 126
In the lead article, Professors Sidney A. Shapiro and Richard E. Levy
argued that Chevron has not resulted in the predicted increase in judicial
deference to agency determinations because it is an inherently indeterminate
123 See, e.g., Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices:
The Courts Run Amok, 59 Mo. L. REv. 895, 937 (1994); Daniel I. Bussel, Power,
Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063,
1085 n.88 (1994); Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball".• NLRB
Policymaking and the Failure ofJudicial Review, 75 B.U. L REV. 387, 436 (1995); Harold
J. Krent, E.pqlaining One-Way Fee Shifling, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2047 n.34 (1993);
Harold J. Krent, The Failed Prondse of Regulatory Variables, 73 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1117,
1119 (1995); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 615-16 (1995); Peter H. Schuck, Legal
Compleity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 16 (1992); Jeffery
M. Stempel, New Paracigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in
Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BRooK. L. REV. 659, 721 n.224 (1993);
Donald W. Stever, et al., The Supreme Court, EPA, and Chevron: The Uncertain Status of
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 25 ENvrL. L. REP. 10127, 10133 (1995);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Preferred Scope of
Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 296, 322-24 (1993); The Supreme Court, 1994
Term-Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REv. 111,304 (1995).
124 See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Justice Breyer on Statutory Review and Interpretation,
8 ADM[N. LJ. Am. U. 755, 764 (1995) ("The application of Chevron in the lower courts
has reduced substantially the degree of inconsistency in the meanings assigned to agency-
administered national statutes."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New
Hypertextualism. An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State,
95 CoLuM. L. REV. 749, 749-50 (1995) ("The Chevron test has largely realized its
potential at the circuit court level. Appellate courts routinely accord deference to agency
constructions of ambiguous language in agency-administered statutes."); Mark Seidenfeld, A
Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REv. 83, 84 n.5 (1995) ("Although [Merrill's study]
has led some commentators to question whether Chevron represents the revolution in
administrative law that many have proclaimed, the lower courts' consistent application
probably has a greater day-to-day impact on the administrative operation of the state.")
(citations omitted); cf 1 DAvIS & PiERcE, supra note 100, at § 3.6 (1995 Supp.) ("If the
trends in the Supreme Court opinions reviewing agency interpretations of agency-
administered statutes persist, their spread to the circuit courts is inevitable.").
125 See generally Symposium, Twenty-Sith Annual Administrative Law Issue, 44
DuKEL.J. 1051 (1995).
126 See supra notes 44-46, 95-97 and accompanying text.
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and manipulable doctrine. 127 As a result, "a court often can write an opinion
that reverses a major agency action as easily as it can write an opinion that
upholds the same action." 128 Shapiro and Levy posit a model of judicial
behavior as a function of two variables: outcomes (or what I have called
decision-making) and craft norms (or what I have called decision-justifying).
According to Shapiro and Levy, judges manipulate Chevron in crafing their
opinions to justify decisions reached on the basis of their ideological beliefs. 129
The other participants in the symposium supported Shapiro and Levy's views
in varying degrees. 130
Moreover, other courts have joined the Sixth Circuit131 in casting a wary
eye on Chevron. For example, the Fifth Circuit has observed that "Chevron is
not quite the 'agency deference' case that it is commonly thought to be by
127 Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review ofAdrrinistrative Decisions, 44 DUKE LJ. 1051 (1995).
128 Richard j. Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44
DuKELJ. 1110, 1110 (1995).
129 Another participant in the symposium, Professor Richard J. Pierce, Jr., offered two
compelling anecdotes of this practice in which judges "Chevron" a case and uphold an
agency's action when they do not have the time or inclination to write the sort of detailed
opinion thought necessary to reverse the agency's action. Id. at 1125-26. Professor Joan
Flynn has made a similar point:
rTihe courts are all too prone to substitute their views for those of the agency-
deference be damned. A central problem is that doctrines of judicial review of agency
action are extremely malleable; as with the canons of statutory construction, judges can
generally find one that gets them where they want to go. The combination of the courts'
tendency toward overreaching and these varied and flexible doctrines is so lethal,
according to some, that whether the agency's policy stands or falls often turns on little
more than the circuit panel's ideological bias.
Flynn, supra note 123, at 433-34 (footnotes omitted); see also Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1333-34 n.179 (1990) ("IThe effect of
Chevron may have been more in the area of judicial rhetoric than actual judicial decision-
making.").
130 See Ronald M. Levin, Judicial Review and the Uncertain Appeal of Certainty on
Appeal, 44 DuKE LJ. 1081 (1995); Thomas 0. McGarity, On Maing Judges Do the Right
Thing, 44 DuKE LJ. 1104 (1995); Pierce, supra note 128; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial
Review of Agency Action: The Problems of Commitment, Non-Contractibility, and the
Proper Incentives, 44 DuKELJ. 1133 (1995).
131 Ohio State Univ. v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 996
F.2d 122, 123 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 114 S. Ct.
2731 (1994).
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many of its supporters (and detractors)." 132 Another court has agreed that "the
Chevron doctrine has been followed only sporadically." 133
Galler may believe that the Chevron revisionists are incorrect, but she
should not blithely ignore their views. She also may think that their conclusions
are somehow inapplicable in the tax context, but the burden again is on her to
explain why. The burden likely would be insurmountable, given the similarity
of the data reported in this article with Merrill's data. The earlier comparison
of the treatment of revenue rulings in the federal courts of appeals cases during
various post-Chevron and pre-Chevron periods, with respect to both the
selective citation of cases by Galer134 as well as the comprehensive review of
cases during the random years examined in this article, 135 confirms Merrill's
finding that the percentage of cases in which the court accepted the agency's
determination actually decreased in the post-Chevron period. Indeed, three of
the four percentages reported with respect to tax cases are virtually identical to
Merrill's administrative law data. 136
Galler's failure to see either the tax trees or the nontax forest is apparent in
her withering criticism of the Sixth Circuit's treatment of revenue rulings. As
discussed earlier, 137 she misses the tax trees by excoriating the Sixth Circuit for
adopting three different approaches 138 without seeing that they have no bearing
on a court's ultimate decision whether to defer to a revenue ruling. She misses
the nontax forest by ignoring the Sixth Circuit's observation in a nontax case
that Chevron simply has not affected the degree of judicial deference to agency
132 Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 299 n.34 (5th Cir. 1994). The
Fifth Circuit noted Merrill's finding of decreased judicial deference through the 1989-90
Term, and then independently examined cases from the 1993-94 Term and concluded that
"this pattern still holds." d.
133 Combee v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 248, 257-58 n.22 (1993), rev'd on other grounds,
34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The court relied on Merrill's "comprehensive and
insightfl" article. Id.
134 See supra notes 52-55.
135 See supra notes 59-62.
136
TABLE SEVEN: PERCENTAGE OF CASES IN WHICH
COURT ACCEPTS AGENCY'S DETERMINATION
Merrill's Admin. Galler's Caron's
Period Law Cases Tax Cases Tax Cases
Post-Chevron 71% 71% 75%
Pre-Chewon 75% 92 % 78%
137 See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
138 Galler, supra note 18, at 1067, 1071-73.
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statutory interpretations. 139 Galler also ignores the importance of a recent tax
ease in which the Sixth Circuit brought its Chewon skepticism to bear on a
question involving judicial deference to the Service's interpretation of the
Code.140
In Wolpaw v. Commissioner,141 the narrow tax issue was whether the
value of a graduate school tuition waiver provided to the wife of a medical
school faculty member was excludable from income as a "scholarship" under
transition relief provided in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.142 Although there
was no revenue ruling on point, the parties relied on the definition of
scholarship in regulations"43 and a private letter ruling.144 The Sixth Circuit
distilled the language from its prior nontax case questioning Chevron's impact
into the following standard for judicial deference to agency statutory
interpretations:
The degree of deference to be accorded an agency's interpretation of a
statute Congress has charged it with administering varies, depending on several
factors, including the existence of a statute mandating a standard of review, the
form and formality of the interpretation, and the consistency of the agency's
interpretation over time. 145
The Sixth Circuit then adapted this general standard to the tax context and
stated that it would "defer to any consistently held, reasonable agency position
that is not contrary to statutory or case law." 146 After an extensive
examination, 147 the court deferred to the Service's statutory interpretation
expressed in the regulations and letter ruling because they represented a
"consistently held and reasonable view." 148 It is Galler's approach to judicial
deference to agency statutory interpretations, not the Sixth Circuit's, that is
139 Ohio State Univ. v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 996
F.2d 122, 123 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 114 S. Ct.
2731 (1994).
140 Galler only cites the case, Wolpaw v. Commissioner, 47 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 1995),
in her discussion of letter rulings. Galer, supra note 18, at 1058 n.112.
14147 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 1995).
142 Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1885(t(3), 100 Stat. 2085, 2872 (1986) (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 117 (note) (1988)).
143 Treas. Reg. 1 1.117-1 (as amended in 1960); id. § 1.117-3 (prior to its amendment
in 1985); id. 1 1.117-4 (prior to its amendment in 1985).
144 Wopaw, 47 F.3d at 792.
145 Aj. at 790.
146 Id. at 791.
147 Id. at 791-94.
14 8 Id. at 794.
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"confused and erratic." 149
Galler does not appreciate the distinction between the decision-making and
decision-justifying functions of judging. As chronicled by Karl Llewellyn'"0
and others, 151 there is a crucial difference between the making of the decision
and the reasoned explanation of that decision given in the written opinion.
Galler's theory of increased judicial deference to revenue rulings goes astray
because it fails to acknowledge that Chevron and prior deference doctrines' 52
149 Galler, supra note 18, at 1067.
150 KARL N. LLEwELLYN, THm COMMON LAW TRADm O: DEaDING APPEALs 56-59
(1960).
151 See, e.g., RUG, RO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 524-603 (The Judging
Process: Making the Decision), 604-75 (The Judging Process: Jus4fyng the Decision) (2d
ed. 1996). BEmAmiN N. CARDozo, THE PARADoxEs OF LEGAL ScmNcE 59-61 (1928);
FRANK COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 155-66 (1980); RIcHARD A. WAssmsTROM, THE
JUDrLL DECISION 25-29 (1961); Joseph C. Hutchinson, Jr., The Judgrment Intuitive: The
Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 274-87 (1929);
Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 721, 721-27 (1979);
Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Juicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REv.
810, 817-19 (1961); Robert I. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand
Theoies: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 26-34
(1993). For a recent debate on the value of candor in judicial opinions, see Scott Altman,
Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296 (1990); Gail Heriot, Way Beyond Candor, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1945 (1991); Scott C. Idelnan, A Prudential Theory ofJudidal Candor, 73
TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995); John J. Kircher, Judicial Candor: Do As We Say, Not As We
Do, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 421 (1990); David L. Schapiro, In Defense of JucHcial Candor, 100
HARv. L. REv. 731 (1987); Robert L. Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Anist: Statutes
and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial
Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEo. LJ. 353 (1989); Alan Hirsch, Candor and
Prudence in Constitutional Adjudication, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 858 (1993) (book
review). For recent commentary on judicial opinion writing, see the following articles from
a recent symposium in the University of Odcago Law Retiew: Martha C. Nussbaum, Poets
as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 1477 (1995);
Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. Ci. L. REv.
1421 (1995); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. Ci. L. REv. 1371 (1995) [hereinafter Wald, Judicial Writings]; Patricia
M. Wald, A Reply to Judge Posner, 62 U. Cmi. L. REV. 1451 (1995); James Boyd White,
Wat's an Opinion For?, 62 U. Cm. L. Rv. 1363 (1995); see also Ronald A. Cass,
Judging: Norms and Incentives for Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REv. 941
(1995).
15 2 For example, Judge Friendly described the ad hoc character of the determination
whether to defer to an agency's statutory interpretation as follows:
inhere are two lines of Supreme Court decisions on this subject which are analytically
in conflict, with the result that a court of appeals must choose the one it deems more
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are primarily used by judges to justify their decisions reached on other
grounds. As Judge Wald 153 and others 154 have suggested, courts fashion their
description of the deference standard in crafting their opinions, emphasizing
pro-deference language when they have decided to accede to the Service's
statutory interpretation and anti-deference language when they have decided to
read the Code differently than the Service. 155 The Sixth Circuit and other
courts thus properly invoke various formulations of the deference standard in
crafting opinions to justify their interpretation of the Code, using all of the
appropriate for the case at hand. [There are eading cases supporting the view that
great deference must be given to the decision of an administrative agency applying a
statute .... However, there [also] is an impressive body of law sanctioning free
substitution of judicial for administrative judgment when the question involves the
meaning of a statutory term.
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (footnote
omitted), aff'd sub. norm. on other growids, Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432
U.S. 249 (1977); see also Mayburg v. Secretary, 740 F.2d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 1984); Ho-
Craft Clothing Co. v. United States, 660 F.2d 910, 913-14 (3d Cir. 1981); William Powell
Co. v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 841, 844 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Colin S. Diver, Statutory
Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 551 (1985).
153 Judge Wald has noted that "[a] shrewd observer can usually tell the way the case
will come out by the way the review standard is described." Wald, Judcial Wrizngs, supra
note 151, at 1391. Judge Wald quoted the deference standard in two opinions written by the
same D.C. Circuit judge involving the review of actions taken by the National Labor
Relations Board. Synergy Gas Corp v. NLRB, 19 F.3d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(Sentelle, J.) (citation omitted) ("This Court will not disturb an order of the NLRB unless,
reviewing the record as a whole, it appears that the Board's factual findings are not
supported by substantial evidence or that the Board acted arbitrarily or otherwise erred in
applying established law to the facts at issue.... We will not 'merely rubber stamp NLRB
decisions.'"); United Steelworkers of America Local Union 14534 v. NLRB, 983 F.2d 240,
244 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Sentelle, J.) (citation omitted) ("The courts accord a very high
degree of deference to administrative adjudications by the NLRB.... It is not necessary
that we agree that the Board reached the best outcome in order to sustain its
decisions.... The Supreme Court has recently instructed that a decision of an agency such
as the Board is to be reversed only when the record is 'so compelling that no reasonable
factfinder could fail to find' to the contrary."). The agency prevailed in one case but not the
other, and Judge Wald asked whimsically, "[guess which case the agency won." Wald,
Judicial Wiings, supra note 151, at 1392.
154 See, e.g., supra note 129 (noting practice of judges who "Oevron" a case and
uphold an agency's action when they do not have the time or inclination to write the sort of
detailed opinion thought necessary to reverse the agency's action).
155 For a perceptive account of the role of judicial interpretation in tax cases, see John
A. Miller, Indetenninacy, CorpleIaty, and Fairnes: Jusnfying Rule Simplification in the
Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REv. 1, 44-49 (1993).
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interpretive tools at their disposal, including revenue rulings.
B. Implications for Tax Litigation
After demonstrating the fatal flaws in Galler's theory of increased judicial
deference, I want to conclude by discussing the implications of the role of
revenue rulings in tax litigation. 156 These implications again demonstrate the
importance of correctly bringing nontax principles to bear on tax issues.
Galler believes that her theory has "profound consequences" 157 to the
practice of tax law. She draws on the specialized courts literature' 58 in
describing a wholesale upheaval in tax litigation. Her vision of the Tax Court
as the only court willing to stand up to the Service and independently examine
revenue rulings is explained as a natural by-product of the court's specialist
status. 159 In contrast, the federal courts of appeals are naturally predisposed to
"reflexively defer" 160 to revenue rulings as generalist judges without any tax
expertise. 161 Although Galler concedes that "deference to revenue rulings itself
is probably not enough to justify a complete reassessment of jurisdiction over
tax litigation, it certainly raises the question whether some of the underlying
premises are false." 162 Her theory supposedly will revolutionize the choice of
forum in which to litigate tax controversies.
Galler believes that in any case where the Service can be expected to cite a
revenue ruling, the only hope for the taxpayer is to litigate the case in the Tax
Court; litigation in a federal district court will be hopeless. 163 Litigation in the
156 Caller, supra note 18, at 1074-95.
157 Id. at 1039.
158 See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADM[N.
L. REV. 329 (1991); Rochelle C. Dreyfiss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized
Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1 (1995); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Specialized Adjudication, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 377; Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A
Cioice?, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 745 (1981); Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial
Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHu. L.
Rav. 603 (1989); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Adinistrative Lawna'ng
System, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1990).
159 Galler, supra note 18, at 1075-77.
160 d. at 1090.
161 Id. at 1077-82.
162Id. at 1090.
163 Id. at 1082-83. I am not exaggerating: "[Tihe choice of forum may categorically
determine the substantive outcome of a case. If the IRS can be expected to cite a revenue
ruling, taxpayers are likely to lose in federal court because federal judges defer to rulings.
Only the Tax Court offers an opportunity for full consideration of taxpayer arguments." id.
at 1039. Galler concedes that "[slome courts of appeals, like the First Circuit, have not
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Tax Court also will improve the taxpayer's appellate chances because a
generalist court of appeals is more likely to defer to the specialist Tax Court
than to a generalist federal district court. 164 Yet if taxpayers pursue this
litigation strategy, they are confronted by the Tax Court's pro-government
bias. 165 Galler bemoans the doctrinal dissonance and calls on either the
Supreme Court to hold that revenue rulings carry absolutely no weight or
Congress to prevent their citation. Galler raises the specter of the militia
movement storming the tax ramparts in concluding that "[d]ecisional
incoherence breeds a loss of faith in the system's fairness and may prompt
taxpayers to seek unlawful means of avoiding taxes." 166
There are a number of difficulties with the tax armageddon scenario
sketched by Galler. Her continued comparison of the Tax Court's position on
revenue rulings with that of the courts of appeals may be a comparison of
apples and oranges; she does not explain the nuances involved in comparing
results in a trial court with those in an appellate court. If, as I have argued, the
proper focus is on the results in cases rather than on the window-dressing
courts use to justify their decisions, Galler needs to account for the deference
standards applied by the appellate court to the Tax Court's decision. 167 Galer
cannot automatically compare trial court results (raising a single question of
deference to the Service) with appellate court results (raising two deference
issues-deference to the Service and deference to the trial court). It would be
better to compare Tax Court results with those of the other tax trial forums, or
at least to differentiate among the appellate court results based on the
adopted definitive standards or guidelines. In courts within these jurisdictions, taxpayers
may still have a chance of prevailing." Id. at 1083 n.238. For criticism of Galler for
ignoring the third forum for litigating tax controversies (trial in the Court of Federal Claims,
with appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), see infra notes 169-72 and
accompanying text.
164 According to Galler, "an appellate court defers to the Tax Court (which in turn
does not defer to revenue rulings) but does not defer to district courts (which do defer to
revenue rulings)." Galler, supra note 18, at 1085.
165 Id. at 1088-90. Galler concedes that her theory of increased deference to revenue
rulings in the courts of appeals but not the Tax Court "stands conventional wisdom on its
head. The accepted practice in the specialist Tax Court is to scrutinize all government
arguments previously asserted in revenue rulings, while the generalist federal judges are
likely to accede to government revenue ruling positions-a decidedly pro-government
practice." Id. at 1090.
16Id. at 1093.
167 Galler acknowledges the issue of appellate court deference to Tax Court cases at
one point in her article, id at 1084-85, but does not explain why the issue does not dog her
entire inquiry.
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originating trial forum.168
Galler's description of the tax litigation process as a clear dichotomy
between the specialist Tax Court and the generalist district courts and courts of
appeals ignores the role of other tax forums. For example, the Court of Federal
Claims 169 is the third trial court option available to taxpayers, with appeal to
the Federal Circuit.' 70 As I have argued elsewhere, 171 these courts are properly
viewed as hybrid courts, possessing features of both specialist courts and
generalist courts. 172 Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court has emerged in recent
168 Although Galler claims that the courts of appeals defer heavily to the Tax Court in
light of its specialized court status, id. at 1083-84, such deference, of course, is not
appropriate in matters of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Qantas Airways Ltd. v. United
States, 62 F.3d 385, 387 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 910 (1996); Bruner v.
United States, 55 F.3d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins.
Co., 49 F.3d 1020, 1021 (4th Cir. 1995); Wolpaw v. Commissioner, 47 F.3d 787, 790 (6th
Cir. 1995); Vinson & Elkins v. Commissioner, 7 F.3d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1993).
Nevertheless, breaking down the appellate court results by the status of the originating court
may be desirable in light of empirical evidence of a higher rate of affirmance for Tax Court
cases than for cases arising from the other tax forums. See K. Martin Worthy, The Ta
Litigation Structure, 5 GA. L. REV. 248, 253 (1971); Special Project, An Enpiica/ Study of
the Intercircuit Conflicts on Federal Income Tax Issues, 9 VA. TAX REV. 125, 140-41
(1989).
169 Prior to 1992, the Court of Federal Claims was called the Claims Court. Federal
Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506. Prior to 1982,
the Claims Court was called the Court of Claims. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
170 For a description of various factors to consider in choosing a tax litigation forum,
see Roi3ERT C. CARLsoN, How TO HANDLE AND WIN A FEDERAL TAX APPEAL 3.01-3.17
(1988); NiNA J. CRimm, TAX COURT LrriGATION: PRAcncE AND PROCEDURE 2.1-2.4
(1992); Nina J. Crimm, Tax Controversies: Ohice of Forun, 9 B.U. J. TAX L. 1 (1991);
Marshall W. Taylor, et al., How to Choose the Right Forun in Tax Litigation, PRAC. LAW.,
June 1991, at 39.
171 Caron, Tax Myopia, supra note 1, at 585 n.*.
172 For further discussion of the hybrid character of the Court of Federal Claims and
the Federal Circuit, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal arcuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1989); Martin D. Ginsburg, The Federal Courts
Study Conmnduee on Claims Court Tax Jwisad'ction, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 631 (1991); Larry
Kramer, Juisaction Over CIvil Tax Cases, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 443; Pauline Newman,
The Federal arcuit :Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 683 (1993);
Helen W. Nies, Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal CIrcuit, 14 GEo. MASON L. REV. 505 (1992); S. Jay Plager, The United States
Courts of AppeaLs, the Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept:
Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 853 (1990). Randall R. Rader,
Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1003 (1991).
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years as a fourth forum for litigating tax disputes. 173 Any discussion of the tax
litigation process thus must account for these alternative forums.
Galler also spouts the "conventional wisdom" 174 that taxpayers who act on
her theory and litigate in the Tax Court in order to escape the clutches of a
revenue ruling will confront pro-government bias. She cites empirical data
from Professor Deborah A. Geier allegedly evidencing such pro-government
bias in the form of greater taxpayer success rates in the district court compared
to the Tax Court.175 Although Galler acknowledges that other commentators do
not subscribe to the pro-government camp, 176 she ignores other empirical data
available in the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that
bear on this question. As I have argued elsewhere, 177 data over a long
period178 indicate that the taxpayer has prevailed approximately one-half as
often in the Tax Court as compared to the District Court and the Court of
173 See, e.g., Francis M. Allegra, Bankrptcy Courts, Te Tax Forn for the 90s, 38
FED. BAR NEWS & J. 338 (1991); Grover Hartt I, Tax Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy
Courts, 50 N.Y.U. INsT. ON FED. TAx'N 35-1 (1992); Robert A. Jacobs, The Banouptcy
Court Energes as Tax Dispute Arbiter of Qunce, 45 TAx LAw. 971 (1992).
174 Galler, supra note 18, at 1088.
175 Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the Proposal Advanced by the
Federal Courts Study Comittee: A Study in Applied onstitut'onal Theory, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 985, 998 (1991).
176 Caller rightly does not rely on a study purporting to show that for the 1980-85
period, nine Tax Court judges had a pro-government bias, seven judges had a pro-taxpayer
bias, and six judges were "neutral." B. Anthony Billings, et al., Are U.S. Tax Court Judges
Decisions Subject to the Bias of the Judge?, 55 TAX NOTES 1259, 1265 (1992). Some
commentators have relied on this study. Miller, supra note 155, at 44-45 n.206. Others
have raised "serious doubts about the authors' premises, methodology, assumptions, and
conclusions." James E. Maule, Are Tax Court Decisions Subject to Bias?, 55 TAX NOTES
1554, 1554 (1992).
177 Caron, Tax Myopia, supra note 1, at 578-81.
178 My Tax Myopia article focused on the 1968-92 period. I have updated these
figures to include information from the 1993 and 1994 Annual Reports.
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Federal Claims, 179 while the taxpayer's overall savings in taxes, penalties, and
interest as a percentage of the amounts at issue were approximately one-half
higher in the Tax Court than in the District Court and Court of Federal
Claims.18 Although "[tihe Annual Reports do not explain the apparent
anomaly that the taxpayer success rate is approximately one-half lower in the
Tax Court while the taxpayer's monetary savings are approximately one-half
higher in the Tax Court," 18' I have suggested several possible explanations fbr
this discrepancy.' 82 Galler's reliance on Geier's incomplete data is particularly
troubling because Tax Court Judge David Laro has recently used my data to
refute Geier's claim of pro-government bias in the Tax Court.ls 3
Finally, Galler's proposed cure is worse than the alleged disease. Galler
contends that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the "ambiguous status" 184
of revenue rulings, and that the "Court's failure to articulate a deference
standard exacerbates the confusion among the lower courts as to the status of
revenue rulings." 185 As I have argued, Galler is the one confused about the
status of revenue rulings. The Court, like the lower federal courts, has
179
TABLE EIGHT: TAXPAYER SUCCESS RATES
IN TAX LITIGATION: 1968-94
Tax Court District Court Court of Federal Claims
16.2% 30.6% 32.7%
My pending Freedom of Information Act request, supra note 64, seeks the release of
the missing 1991-94 data for the district court and the Court of Federal Claims.
180
TABLE NINE: TAXPAYER MONETARY SAVINGS
IN TAX LITIGATION: 1968-94
Tax Court District Court I Court of Federal Claims
68.1% 41.4% 43.7%
My pending Freedom of Information Act request, supra note 64, seeks the release of
the missing 1986 data for the district court and the Court of Federal Claims.
181 Caron, Tax Myopia, supra note 1, at 579.
182 For example, the taxpayer success rate uses only cases that produced a court
opinion while the taxpayer monetary savings uses all cases disposed of during the year (by
dismissal, settlement, or trial). Id. at 580. In addition, the Service's loss in a few high stakes
Tax Court cases could skew the data. Id. at 580 & n.284.
183 See David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995
U. ILL. L. REv. 17, 25 n.16.
184 Galler, supra note 18, at 1073.
185 Id. at 1074.
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historically used revenue rulings in crafting opinions justifying its decisions
reached on other grounds. The window-dressing du jour simply has no effect
on the Court's decision-making 1 8 6
Similarly, Galler's call for Congress to extend section 61100)(3)'s
declaration that letter rulings "may not be used or cited as precedent" 187 to
revenue rulings would not have any real-world consequences. 18 8 As Galler
herself recognizes,189 taxpayers and the Service nevertheless cite letter rulings
in their arguments, and courts often refer to letter rulings in the course of their
opinions. 190 For example, in the recent Wolpaw v. Commissioner91 case
discussed earlier, 192 the Sixth Circuit devoted considerable attention to a
twenty-four year old letter ruling, as well as to the regulations, in the course of
its opinion. The expansion of section 6110()(3) thus would not stop a future
court from referring to revenue rulings in crafting its opinion. Indeed, the
proper judicial attitude toward revenue rulings, as well as toward letter rulings,
was there for Galler to see in one of her own footnotes quoting the views of
two leading tax attorneys on the Wolpaw case: 193 "Our Theorem of
Authoritative Letter Rulings is that although Section 6110() provides that letter
rulings cannot be cited as 'binding precedent,' the courts will find a way to use
them directly or indirectly as legal authority whenever they so desire." 194 Like
186 In its most recent formulation, the Court declared that revenue rulings "do not
have the fbrce and effect of regulations" and "may not be used to overturn the plain
language of a statute." Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 n.8 (1995).187 LR.C. § 6110(jX3) (1988); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-7(b) (1977).
188 Gaiter, supra note 18, at 1095.
189 I. at 1058.
190 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546, 564 n.12 (1993); Rowan Cos. v.
United States, 452 U.S. 247, 261-62 n.17 (1981); Hospital Resource Personnel, Inc. v.
United States, 68 F.3d 421, 428 n.I1 (11th Cir. 1995); Estate of Spencer v. Commissioner,
43 F.3d 226, 234 (6th Cir. 1995); Beck v. Commissioner, 95-2 U.S.T.C. (CCII) 50,474,
at 89,250 (4th Cir. 1995); Julius M. Israel Lodge of B'Nai B'Rith No. 2113 v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCII) 673, 676 (1995); Thompson Elec., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 3045, 3050 (1995); Estate of Pidgeon v. Commissioner,
69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2638, 2640 (1995).
191 47 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 1995).
192 See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
193 Galler, supra note 18, at 1058-59 n.112.
19 4 Sp Tak.. No Regs. ? Appellate Court Cites Letter Ruling Against IRS, 82 J. TAx'N
380, 380 (Sheldon L Banoff & Richard M. Lipton eds., 1995). Wolpaw illustrates the real-
world limitations of the conventional view that "regulations, revenue rulings, and letter
rulings .. . generally are ranked in descending order for purposes of weight or
importance." Galler, supra note 18, at 1041. Although this view is certainly supported by
judicial rhetoric, Wolpaw suggests that in practice judges refer to all three categories of
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a person who stands in front of a mirror that she mistakes for a window, 195
Galler sees only her own reflection, not what is outside in the tax and nontax
worlds.
interpretive guidance in fashioning opinions to justify their own construction of the Code.
The leading tax treatise supports treating revenue rulings much like regulations:
[Courts often state] that a revenue ruling in conflict with the statute is "without any
force, which is true but is equally true of regulations and is usually beside the point.
The issue ordinarily is whether a revenue ruling's interpretation of an ambiguous statute
should be given weight in deciding the disputed issue. As considered expressions of the
IRS' views, revenue rulings and regulation differ more in degree than in kind, and it is
not clear that a sharp distinction in their weight is warranted.
4 BoRis I. BnrrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
Gnwrs 110-56 (2d ed. 1992).
195 C Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public OW'ce and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Ilustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 76
(1990) (coining this metaphor).
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